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Abstract 
 
The purpose of the article is to substantiate the 
thesis about human dignity as the initial and 
universal legal value. The investigation belongs 
to philosophical and legal anthropology and 
axiology. In the process of research, 
phenomenological and analytical methods in 
their unity and complementarity were used. The 
article draws attention to the tendency of 
increasing interest to the value component of law 
in contemporary legal philosophy and doctrine. 
Traditionally, justice is recognized as the main 
legal value embodying the high purpose of law. 
It is a complex value and embodies a certain ratio 
of no less universal legal values based on human 
experience, such as human dignity, freedom and 
equality. Since the mid-twentieth century, human 
dignity has become the “new key concept” for 
law. This was due to the desire to prevent a 
recurrence of the state of barbarism – massive 
and large-scale humiliation of it during the 
Second World War. As an expression of a 
person’s intrinsic value, his subjectivity, human 
dignity is considered as a value basis of human 
rights as a whole, as well as an independent right, 
the inviolability of which is enshrined in the 
fundamental international documents and 
constitutions of developed countries. It finds 
protection in the practice of national 
Constitutional Courts (primarily the German 
Federal Constitutional Court), the European 
Court of Human Rights and other legal 
institutions. The ethical priority of dignity in the 
system of legal values emphasizes the 
universality of human rights, which are based on 
the initial and unconditional recognition of the 
other in his uniqueness, regardless of his 
belonging to a particular community. 
   
Анотація 
 
Метою статті є обґрунтування тези про гідність 
людини як вихідну і універсальну правову 
цінність. Дослідження належить до 
філософсько-правової антропології та 
аксіології. У його процесі використовувалися 
феноменологічний і аналітичний методи в їх 
єдності і взаємодоповнюваності. У статті 
звертається увага на тенденцію посилення 
інтересу до ціннісної складової права в 
сучасній правовій філософії та доктрині. 
Традиційно основною правовою цінністю, яка 
втілює в собі високе призначення права, 
визнається справедливість. Вона є складною 
цінністю і втілює в собі певне співвідношення 
не менш універсальних правових цінностей, 
ґрунтованих у людському досвіді, таких як 
людська гідність, свобода і рівність. Із 
середини ХХ століття «новим ключовим 
поняттям» для права стає людська гідність. Це 
було зумовлено прагненням не допустити 
повторення стану варварства – масового та 
масштабного приниження гідності під час 
Другої світової війни. Як вираз самоцінності 
людини, її суб’єктності, людська гідність 
розглядається і як ціннісна основа прав людини 
в цілому, і як певне самостійне право, 
недоторканність якого закріплена в 
основоположних міжнародних документах і 
конституціях розвинених країн. Вона 
знаходить захист в практиці національних 
конституційних судів (перш за все – 
Федерального конституційного суду 
Німеччини), Європейського суду з прав 
людини та інших правових інститутах. 
Етичний пріоритет гідності в системі правових 
цінностей підкреслює універсальність прав 
людини, заснованих на безумовному визнанні 
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іншого в його унікальності, незалежно від 
приналежності до тієї чи іншої спільноти. 
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Introduction 
 
The processes of global changes in the modern 
world condition an increase in attention to their 
value component, which bears the imprint of 
these processes, and gives signals about trends 
and prospects for their further development. This 
is especially noticeable in relation to such a 
sphere of society as law, in which there is a shift 
in guidelines from value neutrality to value 
fullness. This leads to increased interest in 
research in the field of axiology of law in post-
Soviet jurisprudence (Babenko, 2002; Vetiutnev, 
2013) and even the separation of the value 
component of law into a special structural 
element of the legal system, the so-called 
“axiosphere of law” (Gorobets, 2013). In modern 
Western philosophy of law, the topic of the 
relationship between law and values is 
considered in a more applied scope, for example, 
as a correlation of values and principles in the 
structure of constitutional rights (Alexy, 2002), 
or as a recreation of the classical formulation of 
the question of the value and purpose of law 
(Sellers, 2019). In the framework of the 
humanistic worldview, recognition of a man as 
the basic value is obvious. This causes the 
attention of legal philosophers to the topic of 
human dignity as an inalienable property of a 
human being. At this, dignity is regarded as the 
basis of human rights (Waldron, 2015) and as 
constitutional value (Chaskalson, 2002). The 
study of human dignity as a philosophical and 
legal category (Hryshchuk, 2018) and as a 
category of constitutionalism (Shevchuk, 2018) 
has been developed recently in Ukraine. 
 
In this, the growing demand for axiology in 
modern jurisprudence is accompanied by a crisis 
of values justification and a rethinking of their 
nature. This is especially true with respect to 
dignity – a concept that in the modern world, on 
the one hand, is extremely relevant, and on the 
other hand, is seriously criticized (Singer, 1993, 
pp. 88-89). 
 
In a legal context, human dignity is studied 
primarily in the framework of conceptual 
analysis. Thus, prominent German philosopher 
Jürgen Habermas analyzes the role of the concept 
of dignity in the composition of human rights 
from a systematic, conceptual and historical 
point of view. He explains the origin of human 
rights from the moral source of human dignity 
and connects with this their explosive power as a 
“realistic utopia” (Habermas, 2010). At the same 
time, the question of substantiating the very 
essence of dignity in jurisprudence often remains 
open. As Mette Lebech points out, the history of 
the expression “human dignity” is not identical 
with the history of human dignity as such while 
“What human dignity is determines how it can be 
used in an argument to ground and defend human 
rights, and many might think that it also 
determines how effectively it can do this” 
(Lebech, 2009, p. 151). Within the 
phenomenological approach Lebech investigates 
the idea of human dignity in the Western 
philosophical tradition and describes haw human 
dignity is experienced. A similar 
phenomenological account of human dignity was 
recently presented by Uriah Kriegel (2017). At 
the same time, phenomenologists, as a rule, do 
not emphasize the legal implications of their 
conclusions. However, a combination of the two 
aforementioned areas of understanding of 
dignity, it seems, can be very productive. 
 
The purpose of this article is to substantiate the 
thesis about human dignity as the initial and 
universal legal value. Such an approach involves, 
as a preliminary task, the search for an answer to 
questions about what values are, how values and 
law are related, and also what values determine 
the internal content of law, its basis (1), and then 
the disclosure of the essence of human dignity (2) 
and its significance as the basic, universal legal 
value (3).  
 
Methodology 
 
The whole of the following investigation can be 
considered as belonging to philosophical and 
legal anthropology and axiology. Based on the 
subject of study characteristics, the methods 
applied in the paper involve phenomenological 
and analytical ones in their unity and 
complementarity. In this, the authors aim to give 
a fresh look at dignity – not from the point of 
view of norms and institutions, but from the 
perspective of experience. This determines the 
main motive of the study, which coincides with 
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the main motive of phenomenology – the desire 
to think the world, first of all, not as the object of 
our cognition or technical domination, but as 
what happens to us. The study of the 
anthropological foundations of dignity is carried 
out as part of a phenomenological clarification of 
the kind of experience we have in its presence 
and which is the experience of mutual 
recognition. The methods of logical analysis and 
comparison are used to comprehend various 
theories about the foundations of dignity, as well 
as to determine the place of dignity in the 
structure of legal values. Using the method of 
historical and philosophical reconstruction, the 
transformation of ideas about dignity in the 
twentieth century is traced. The formal legal 
method will be used to analyze international 
documents that protect human dignity, as well as 
national legislation and the practice of its 
application. 
 
Results and discussions 
 
Legal values 
 
Values, this is something that is significant, 
important for a person and evokes a positive 
attitude towards oneself. They represent the goals 
that people strive for. Values are associated with 
satisfaction of human needs, they motivate 
human activity. 
 
A person evaluates certain phenomena or 
processes in terms of their significance as good 
or bad, right or wrong, that is, makes the activity 
of evaluation. The criterion on the basis of which 
the evaluation is made is values. They are 
embodied in the real life of people: on the one 
hand, in the being of people themselves as their 
specific qualities or virtues (prudence, courage, 
wisdom, justice); on the other hand, in the 
existence of things and events as a good (order, 
culture, civilization) (Alekseev, 1999, p. 101). 
 
Since law is a cultural-historical phenomenon, 
that is, a phenomenon created by man, its nature 
and content cannot be understood without 
applying to the values that it embodies and that it 
protects. Such values are called the legal values. 
Thus, legal values determine the essence and 
purpose of law underlying it. They find their 
embodiment (objectification) in the principles of 
law and legal norms. Each legal norm, which is 
not of a purely technical nature, serves as the 
embodiment, development, specification of a 
certain value. Particularly close relationship 
exists between legal values and the principles of 
law. If value focuses activity on a desired goal, 
then the principle determines general 
requirements for ensuring the implementation of 
such a goal (justice as the value and the principle 
of justice). 
 
The concept of legal values is usually associated 
with the natural law approach, which emphasizes 
the content of law. Thus, even Augustine (The 
City of God) emphasized that the difference 
between the state and the band of robbers lies in 
the fact that it is based on justice: “Justice being 
taken away, then, what are kingdoms but great 
robberies?” 
 
Without going into arguments about the nature of 
law, in serving this universal value the value and 
purpose of law is expressed. As Mortimer Sellers 
(2019) writes:  
 
The purpose of law is to serve justice, all law 
claims to do so, and is justified and legitimate 
only when it does so in fact. The recognition, 
legislation, interpretation, and application of the 
law will always be governed by these purposes, 
whether acknowledged or not, and all assertions 
of law are supported, explicitly or implicitly, by 
the claim of systemic justice (p. 51).  
 
At the same time, the idea of justice is revealed 
through other values, rooted in the mode of being 
in the world, or in a human experience, – 
freedom, equality and dignity. Depending on 
priorities, most theories of justice can be divided 
into those based on freedom, welfare, or virtues 
(Sandel, 2010). In this, the value of freedom, 
equality and dignity is not only conventionally 
postulated, but is presupposed by the very 
structure of experience as a mode of our being in 
the world. In turn, justice is a complex value 
designed to guarantee equality in freedom and 
dignity. In other words, the idea of justice is both 
descriptive and normative, since “is” and “ought” 
merge in the concept of experience, or, quoting 
Lloyd L. Weinreb (1987), “kosmos lies within 
ourselves” (p. 249). Understood in this way, 
freedom, equality, dignity and justice are not just 
values subject to legal protection, but meanings 
that constitute law. 
 
The fundamental nature of these meanings is 
reflected in Art. 1 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: “All human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights.”  
 
Among these fundamental values, it is dignity 
that remains the greatest mystery, despite the fact 
that this concept is central to most Western 
ethical systems. On the other hand, we suggest, it 
is dignity that is most closely related to that 
aspect of human existence that can be called the 
experience of law. What this experience is? And 
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how does this experience ground our legal 
institutions? 
 
Human dignity: from experience to norm 
 
Dignity is connected to such a kind of 
experience, or a part of our everyday life, as 
experience of mutual recognition. It is 
noteworthy that Fichte and Hegel, whose ideas 
are associated with the origins of the modern 
discourse of mutual recognition, reveal this 
concept in the context of philosophical and legal 
considerations. Later, in the phenomenology of 
law, mutual recognition is regarded as a 
condition for the possibility of law. Thus, 
according to Nikolay Alekseev (1999), the rights 
and duties as two types of law are constituted in 
acts of mutual recognition – special intentional 
acts, expressed in the focus on the Other, who is 
seen as a value that deserves legal protection (p. 
83-86). The direction of such recognition is 
twofold – to the other and to the norm: I 
recognize the norm while recognizing the 
generalized other, who constantly reminds me of 
my duties towards all other people, who, in turn, 
recognize me as the bearer of rights (Honneth, 
1995, pp. 107-121). 
 
In traditional societies, this recognition is 
confirmed by the ritual exchange of gifts, during 
which there is a constant circulation of return 
gifts, and each return gesture confirms the 
subjectivity of the first giver. Thus, people 
confirm to each other that they are not things 
(Ricoeur, 2010, p. 214), that is, confirm the 
dignity of each other. In his study of the gift, 
Marcel Hénaff (2015) very convincingly shows 
how the gesture of mutual acceptance and unity 
as the core of these rituals, was transferred to the 
legal institutions of modern society (pp. 77-84). 
Today, the direct expression of mutual 
recognition is human rights, which guarantee 
everyone the minimum public recognition of his 
equal freedom and equal dignity. 
 
In this, unlike market relations, where it is a 
matter of mutual recognition of the members of a 
community on the basis of equivalent exchange, 
law is based on the initial excess recognition of 
any other. What in traditional cultures found 
expression in the traditions of hospitality is 
embodied in the modern world in the idea of 
universal human rights and duties to refugees. 
And, as Hénaff (2019) notes, outside of 
ceremonial procedures and locally established 
communities, there is no other justification for 
the requirement to recognize the radical 
otherness of the other than his absolute dignity 
(p. 412). 
The question is, who is this other? Around this 
question, debate over dignity criteria is 
unfolding.  
 
What could be the defining feature inherent 
exclusively to a human being, thanks to which 
the dignity of a human being would be 
recognized? Or, as Francis Fukuyama (2002) 
formulates this, what is Factor X – “some 
essential human quality underneath that is wor-
thy of a certain minimal level of respect”             
(p. 149). 
 
There are three main answers to this question. 
 
1. Likeness to God. This is a religious 
(Christian) approach. Since God created 
man in his own image and likeness 
(Bible, Genesis 1:26), this rises him 
above all living beings. Although what 
is exactly this likeness, or similarity, is 
interpreted differently, but in any case, 
it includes reason and free will. 
2. Designing one’s own capabilities. A 
person’s need to make himself what he 
would like to be is what distinguishes a 
person from other living beings. 
3. The end in itself. Immanuel Kant sees a 
man as a self-centered being. It is 
human rationality and autonomy as a 
consequence of this rationality that are 
the distinctive features of a man and 
give him “priceless dignity”: 
“Autonomy is thus the ground of the 
dignity of the human and of every 
rational nature” (2002, p. 54).  
 
Nevertheless, it will be difficult for someone who 
is not a Christian believer to recognize the 
similarity of a man to God as the basis of his 
dignity. Difficulties may also arise for a person 
with a materialistic worldview with the Kantian 
understanding of human dignity. Therefore, in a 
society neutral from the point of view of religion 
and worldview, both of these lines of proving can 
come closer together. Within the framework of 
understanding human dignity on the basis of 
“designing one’s capabilities”, the social 
principle of human dignity can be formulated as 
the socially recognized ability of a person to be 
what he wants to be, even if this ability cannot be 
actually realized (Kirste, 2010, p. 128). 
 
Despite the lack of a generally accepted answer 
to the question of dignity criteria, today dignity 
is given an evident ethical priority over other 
legal values. The very opening sentence of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads: 
“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and 
of the equal and inalienable rights of all members 
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of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world, …” 
 
Human dignity within contemporary legal 
reality 
 
The idea of human dignity, as well as the ideas of 
freedom, equality, justice, belong to the main 
topics of legal thought since the ancient times. 
Nevertheless, its importance as a legal concept 
(principle, value) sharply increased after the 
Second World War, when humanity faced the 
terrible cases of mass humiliation of human 
dignity in incredibly vast scope. To prevent the 
return of such state of barbarism, human dignity 
becomes a “new key concept” for law which 
contains the understanding that a person, due to 
his special properties that distinguish him from 
all other living beings, should be treated with a 
special care. As Kharytonov, Kharytonova, 
Kharytonova, Kolodin, & Tolmachevska (2019, 
p. 478) wrote, “the Second World War has 
become a kind of catharsis, showing the possible 
height and fall of the human spirit, the price and 
pricelessness of human life, honor, and dignity”. 
So, since the middle of the 20th century, human 
dignity has been regarded as the highest and 
inviolable value, which is at the top of the 
constitutional order, and the constitutional 
provision of its inviolability is an 
“anthropological prerequisite” and the starting 
point of all actions of a state. 
 
The idea of human dignity is expressed in well-
known legal documents. The 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, article 1 states: 
“All people are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights”. The European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in the preamble notes: “The 
European Union is founded on indivisible, 
universal values of human dignity, freedom, 
equality and solidarity”. The provision on human 
dignity as the most important constitutional value 
is reflected in some national constitutions, 
including the Constitution of Ukraine, the article 
3 of which states: “An individual, his life and 
health, honor and dignity, inviolability and 
security shall be recognized in Ukraine as the 
highest social value”. 
 
 The most thorough idea of human dignity is 
presented in the Constitution (The Basic Law) of 
Germany: “Human dignity is inviolable. To 
respect and protect it is the duty of all state 
authority”. There the value of human dignity is 
not only recognized, but the principle of the 
inviolability of human dignity as an important 
basis for its protection is also established. The 
doctrinal consolidation of the provision on 
human dignity as a right and a constitutional 
value was maintained in the Decision of the 
Constitutional Court of Ukraine of May 23, 2018 
No. 5-r / 2018:  
 
... human dignity must be interpreted as the right 
guaranteed by Article 28 of the Constitution of 
Ukraine, and as constitutional value, which fills 
human being with meaning, is the foundation for 
all constitutional rights, a measure of 
determining their essence and a criterion for the 
admissibility of possible restrictions on these 
rights. 
 
The principle of human dignity in the functioning 
of the legal system is expressed through 
recognition of the status of a person as a subject 
of law as a holder of rights and obligations. That 
is, the recognition of a person as a subject of law 
(in accordance with the doctrine of the statuses of 
the German lawyer Georg Jellinek) confirms the 
recognition of his human dignity. Recognition of 
human dignity stems from subjectivity. A person 
has rights and obligations, can build his life by 
designing and implementing life projects. 
 
In this aspect, human dignity is considered as the 
basis of human rights and, according to Jellinek, 
appears in accordance with the following 
statuses: negative status (status negativus) – in 
individual civil rights, which are a manifestation 
of the right to protection from arbitrary 
interference in human life; positive status (status 
positivus) - in the right to positive actions of the 
state to ensure a decent life (social rights); active 
status (status activus) – in participation rights, 
i.e. political rights (1905, 86 ff.). 
 
Thus, the recognition of human subjectivity 
serves as a justification for the status of human 
dignity as the foundation of human rights. As 
John Tasioulas wrote: “Both universal human 
interests and human dignity are values that lie at 
the foundations of human rights; they are the 
underlying values that ground human rights 
claims” (2019, p. 1179). On the one hand, all 
human rights stem from the recognition of the 
person’s dignity, and on the other, the institution 
of human rights serves as the best form of 
embodiment and protection of the dignity of the 
person. 
 
The philosophical approach to substantiating the 
thesis of human dignity as the basis of human 
rights is demonstrated by Jürgen Habermas. In 
the article “The Concept of Human Dignity and 
the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights”, he argues 
that the idea of human dignity is the normative 
source of modern basic human rights. This idea 
implies that rights are rooted in the universal 
content of morality. By their very legal essence, 
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they are called upon to protect human dignity, 
which has, on the one hand, self-esteem, and on 
the other, the social recognition of the 
international status of democratic citizenship as 
its necessary connotations. Hence, the necessary 
correlation with the concept of realistic utopia, 
the inalienable goal of which is the realization of 
social justice inherent in the very institutions of a 
democratic constitutional state (Habermas, 
2010). We observe how, like a reconstruction of 
the unfolding of universal legal values in 
Ulpian’s concept from the original legal value of 
“honest life”, or dignity, Habermas (2010) shows 
that “human dignity” should also be considered a 
moral “source”, which in content contains all 
basic rights: “Human dignity, which is one and 
the same everywhere and for everyone, grounds 
the indivisibility of all categories of human 
rights” (p. 35). The absoluteness of human 
dignity as a universal value is derived from the 
absolute value of a person. The “infinite dignity” 
of each person exists because all others honor 
this sphere of free will as untouchable, that is, as 
a result of social recognition. “Only this internal 
connection between human dignity and human 
rights give rise to the explosive fusion of moral 
contents with coercive law as the medium in 
which the construction of just political order 
must be performed” (p. 47), an outstanding 
philosopher concludes his reflection on the 
relationship between human rights and human 
dignity. 
 
In addition to recognizing human dignity as the 
basis of human rights, the right to dignity is also 
justified as a separate human right. In particular, 
in the Constitution of Ukraine and in the doctrine, 
one finds recognition of such a right: “Everyone 
has the right to respect for his dignity” (The 
Constitution of Ukraine, art. 28). 
 
The problem of human dignity has been 
repeatedly raised in the decisions of the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany. This allowed 
formulating principles for resolving cases on 
these issues. First of all, the criterion for the 
violation of human dignity is the attitude on the 
part of state power to a person as an object. 
 
An appeal to the constitutional principle of the 
inviolability of human dignity formed the basis 
of the argumentation regarding the so-called 
Aviation Security Act. In 2006, the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany considered the 
issue of constitutionality of the law on “Aviation 
Security” adopted by the Parliament. The 
Parliament then kept in mind a 9/11 scenario, that 
is, a terrorist attack on the twin towers of the 
World Trade Center, and therefore allowed in 
situations where a passenger plane turns into a 
live bomb, to shoot it down to protect a much 
larger number of people who are on the ground. 
It was a violation of human dignity due to the 
attitude to people as objects that formed the basis 
for the conclusion that the decision of the 
German Parliament was unconstitutional: 
 
Moreover, para. 3 § 14 of the Aviation Security 
Act is not compatible with the constitutional right 
to life and with a guarantee of personal dignity if, 
as a result of the use of armed forces, innocent 
people on board of an aircraft are affected. The 
indicated persons become exclusively objects, 
since the state takes their lives for the sake of 
saving other people; they are denied human value 
(Selected Decisions of the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany, 2018, p. 46). 
 
The protection of human dignity is maintained 
not only in constitutional, but also in other 
branches of law. 
 
Medical law prohibits human cloning, which is 
considered an interference with human nature, 
which is detrimental to human dignity (The 
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome 
and Human Rights, Additional Protocol on the 
Prohibition of Human Cloning to the Council of 
Europe Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, European Union Charter on 
Fundamental rights). In addition, the 
constitutional provision is specified in medical 
law that no person can be subjected to medical, 
scientific or other experiments without his 
voluntary consent. 
 
The Civil Code of Ukraine provides for such a 
way of protecting civil rights and interests, as 
compensation for non-pecuniary damage, which 
fulfills the humanistic mission of protecting 
human dignity. The right to social security is 
designed to guarantee citizens an adequate 
standard of living and social security as 
components of a decent existence. 
 
In addition to the constitutional provision that no 
one may be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment, the 
Criminal Code of Ukraine states that the 
punishment is not intended to inflict physical 
suffering or humiliation of human dignity, but 
according to the Executive-Penal Code of 
Ukraine, convicts have the right to a humane 
attitude to themselves and respect for the dignity 
inherent in the human person. In turn, The 
Criminal Procedure Law prohibits the 
transformation of people into a defenseless 
object of state activity, which is disposed of as an 
object, and helps to restore the dignity of the 
victim and protect the rights and freedoms of the 
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suspect /accused. All this gives the reason to 
consider human dignity as an evaluation criterion 
within the limits of procedural justice. 
 
Conclusions  
 
A look at the value dimension of law from the 
standpoint of identifying deep systemic links 
between universal or basic legal values 
expressing the very nature of law, such as human 
dignity, freedom, equality and justice, made it 
possible to identify their systemic unity, centered 
around an integral value – justice. At the same 
time, the anthropological approach to the system 
of legal categories, or values, made it possible to 
emphasize the dignity of a person as an initial 
legal value that affects the configuration of other 
universal legal values. 
 
The emphasis on human dignity as the most 
important guideline of natural law thinking in the 
newest conditions allows us to organically 
introduce the moral dimension into law, as its 
fundamental basis. Human dignity is recognized 
as the most important moral and legal value, 
through which the normative legitimization of 
human rights as a normative idea and legal 
institution is carried out.  
 
The ethical priority of dignity in the system of 
legal values emphasizes the universality of 
human rights, which are based on the initial and 
unconditional recognition of the other in his 
uniqueness, regardless of his belonging to a 
particular community. 
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